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Author: |
Jim Garamone |
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American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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I am announcing a decision to temporarily increase the active-duty end strength of the Army by up to 22,000. That is a temporary increase from the current authorized end -- permanent end strength of 547,000 to an authorized temporary end strength of 569,000 active-duty soldiers.
[...]
Q ...A couple weeks, now, past the June 30th [2009] handover of control in the cities in Iraq, how do you assess the level of cooperation and the level of tension between U.S. forces and Iraqi forces, particularly in Baghdad? There's been a couple of reports of disagreements or even stand-offs over who gets to do what when. Are you convinced that you have the authority you need to protect the force and that you can operate as you need to?
SEC. GATES: I received a report from General Odierno just today that addressed this issue. And he said that the level of cooperation and collaboration with the Iraqi security forces is going much better than is being portrayed publicly and in the media. So my impression from his reporting, and not just this week but over the last couple of weeks, has been that it's actually, in his view, going quite well.
[...]
Q Mr. Secretary and Admiral, there seems to have been a change, both substantively and rhetorically, coming out of Iraq, where, substantively, lower-level American commanders say that they're being asked to provide route convoy information before they leave, which they worry about for obvious security reasons. And rhetorically, there were comments today, which I was struck by, from the spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, who was describing America's soldiers in Iraq as being under house arrest. He said that: They're getting impatient because we confine them to their bases, which are like big prisons; they're under house arrest. So, two questions. One, substantively: How confident are you that the safety of American troops is being protected, given that you have commanders speaking openly with fears that it is not currently as safe as it could be? But, two, if the Iraqis see our presence there as putting us under house arrest, putting our soldiers into that prison, why are we there?
SEC. GATES: Well, first of all, I think that I certainly have not heard anything from General Odierno that would indicate that our soldiers have been put at increased risk. And second, it is perhaps a measure of our success in Iraq that politics have come to the country.
[...]
Q Senator Gillibrand is talking about adding a -- an amendment to the Defense Authorization Bill that would give an 18- month moratorium on 'don't ask, don't tell.' Do you support that -- such an amendment being added? And some have noted that there's been a change of tone from this building about 'don't ask, don't tell.' Earlier this year you said, 'It's the law; we will implement the law.' Later you said you were looking at ways to bend the law. Why the change in tone?
SEC. GATES: Well, for one thing, we have a new president -- (chuckles) -- who has a different policy, and we will support what his goal is here. I'm not going to speak to specific legislation. I would just say this: that if -- first of all, we -- even as we look for ways to apply the law more humanely and as we look at how we might begin to implement the law, the only thing -- a change in the law, should that happen -- the only thing we have continued to say, and I think certainly I believe, and I think I can speak for the chairman in this, is that if the law does change, then it is important that the implementation be deliberate and careful. This is not something that should be -- in my view, should be done abruptly, because I think that we have a force under great stress in two wars, and to try and do something abruptly, I think, would be a real concern.
Q Have you taken any steps to apply the law more humanely, as you said?
SEC. GATES: We're still looking at that. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/Ss3sW |
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Q A question for both of you, please. A couple weeks, now, past the June 30th handover of control in the cities in Iraq, how do you assess the level of cooperation and the level of tension between U.S. forces and Iraqi forces, particularly in Baghdad? There's been a couple of reports of disagreements or even stand-offs over who gets to do what when. Are you convinced that you have the authority you need to protect the force and that you can operate as you need to?
[...]
ADM. MULLEN: All discussions I've had with General Odierno, including one midweek last week, about this issue have been very positive. Certainly there are challenges. I would point out the independent effort that the Iraqi forces provided recently in terms of providing security for the visit of many, many Iraqis to a very sacred mosque. And that, as an example -- the -- we continue to clearly work with them. But from the time actually before the 30th of June when we had been pulling out of cities until up to now, it's been positive. There clearly are challenges, but I think the leadership is working its way through each one of those challenges. So I'm encouraged.
[...]
Q Mr. Secretary and Admiral, there seems to have been a change, both substantively and rhetorically, coming out of Iraq, where, substantively, lower-level American commanders say that they're being asked to provide route convoy information before they leave, which they worry about for obvious security reasons. And rhetorically, there were comments today, which I was struck by, from the spokesperson for the Iraqi Ministry of Defense, who was describing America's soldiers in Iraq as being under house arrest. He said that: They're getting impatient because we confine them to their bases, which are like big prisons; they're under house arrest. So, two questions. One, substantively: How confident are you that the safety of American troops is being protected, given that you have commanders speaking openly with fears that it is not currently as safe as it could be? But, two, if the Iraqis see our presence there as putting us under house arrest, putting our soldiers into that prison, why are we there?
...
ADM. MULLEN: What I would only add to that is, being -- having been in Kirkuk the other day and spending the better part of the day with the brigade commander there, who has been there over a half a year, his interaction with the security forces, both police as well as the army -- and in addition, he's in a spot where he's looking at the interface between Peshmerga as well as the Iraqi army, as well. And believe me, the idea that he was somehow either handcuffed or unable to do what he's doing -- was -- what he's supposed to do, it just never came up. |
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Name(s:) |
Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Chair |
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Agency(ies): |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/vXH5F |
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Author: |
John Kruzel |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Defense Department Briefing |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
CSPAN Video Library |
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Army Maj. Gen. James L. Terry, commanding general of the 10th Mountain Division; Army Col. David M. Miller, commander of the division's 2nd Brigade Combat Team; and Army Lt. Col. Michael N. Davey, 2nd BCT deputy commander, conduct an inspection by 'trooping the line' during a Sept. 25, 2009, deployment ceremony at Fort Drum, N.Y. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Jennie M. Burrett |
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Name(s:) |
Jennie Burrett |
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Title: |
2nd Brigade Combat Team PAO NCOIC |
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Agency(ies): |
United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
2nd Brigade Combat Team 10th Mountain Division |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/5hIFC |
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Author: |
Jennie Burrett |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Public Affairs, 2nd Brigade Combat Team 10th Mountain Division, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
2nd BCT Soldiers prepare for upcoming deployment |
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Author: |
Rebecca Schwab |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Public Affairs, 2nd Brigade Combat Team 10th Mountain Division |
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Title: |
10th Mountain Division 'Commandos' Set to Return to Dramatically Improved Iraq |
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Author: |
Donna Miles |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Author: |
Michael Carden |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Panel to explore ending 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' |
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Author: |
John Kruzel |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Department of Defense Authoirzation for Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2011, and To Receive Testimony Relating to the 'Don't Ask, Don't Tell' Policy |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Senate Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate |
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WikiLeaks, a whistle-blowing Web site that publishes anonymous submissions and leaked documents |
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Name(s:) |
John Kruzel |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/VVw2t |
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I think it should not have any lasting consequences. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/VVw2t |
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We are in the process right now of assessing the documents,' Lapan added.
[...]
The Pentagon has yet to confirm the impact of the reports, as it's still early in the assessment process, Lapan said.
[...]
'As they are made available, we will be looking at them to try to determine potential damage to lives of our servicemembers and our coalition partners; whether they reveal sources in methods and any potential damage to national security,' he said. 'Since this was just released last night, we're still in the process going through that assessment.'
[...]
It could take the Pentagon weeks to make such determinations, Lapan said. But much of what the Pentagon has discovered early in the investigation is that the documents are classified at a 'secret' level, and not 'top-secret,' which is reserved for more sensitive material, he said.
[...]
'There's nothing we've seen so far that is particularly relevant,' Lapan added. |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/4GgwU |
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Title: |
Pentagon Assesses Leaked Documents |
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Author: |
Michael Carden |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Pentagon Assesses Leaked Documents |
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Author: |
Michael Carden |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Archive Link |
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I also urged the House leaders to pass the necessary funding to support our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I know much has been written about this in recent days as a result of the substantial leak of documents from Afghanistan covering a period from 2004 to 2009.
While I'm concerned about the disclosure of sensitive information from the battlefield that could potentially jeopardize individuals or operations, the fact is these documents don't reveal any issues that haven't already informed our public debate on Afghanistan; indeed, they point to the same challenges that led me to conduct an extensive review of our policy last fall. So let me underscore what I've said many times: For seven years, we failed to implement a strategy adequate to the challenge in this region, the region from which the 9/11 attacks were waged and other attacks against the United States and our friends and allies have been planned.
That's why we've substantially increased our commitment there, insisted upon greater accountability from our partners in Afghanistan and Pakistan, developed a new strategy that can work, and put in place a team, including one of our finest generals, to execute that plan. Now we have to see that strategy through. And as I told the leaders, I hope the House will act today to join the Senate, which voted unanimously in favor of this funding, to ensure that our troops have the resources they need and that we're able to do what's necessary for our national security. |
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Name(s:) |
Barack Obama |
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Title: |
President of the United States |
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Agency(ies): |
White House |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/I3kTB |
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Title: |
Remarks by the President After Bipartisan Leadership Meeting, Rose Garden |
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Author: |
Barack Obama |
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Title: |
President of the United States |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
White House |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Presidential Remarks on WikiLeaks of Classified Documents |
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Author: |
Barack Obama |
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Title: |
President of the United States |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
White House |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Title: |
Obama: Issues in Leaked Documents Led to Review |
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Author: |
Lisa Daniel |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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An investigation has been initiated, [and] Army CID has the lead,' Lapan said.
[...]
'(CID) is an investigative agency that has the ability, the capability, to do these types of things,' Lapan said. 'There are a number of investigative agencies (within the Pentagon), but the decision was made that Army CID takes the lead.'
[...]
Army CID, he said, also is investigating the case of Army Spc. Bradley Manning, who has been charged with leaking a video of a U.S. helicopter attack in Iraq to WikiLeaks. The document leaks investigation is a continuation or extension of the existing open investigation on Manning, Lapan said.
[...]
However, he added, the document leak investigation is 'broader' than the Manning case.
[...]
'The current investigation into the leak of the documents to WikiLeaks isn't focused on any one, specific individual,' Lapan said. 'It's much broader. They're going to look everywhere to determine what the source may be.' |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/WUE6Y |
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The answer, Morrell said, is 'to go after the 'bad actors,' hold them responsible, prosecute them to the fullest extent of the law, but don't change the fundamental trusting relationship that makes the military so effective.'
[...]
'We are aligned in that respect,' Morrell said of the U.S.-Pakistan relationship. 'But we each have our own interests here that we have to balance and work through. We think we're making a lot of progress there, but we're not alone in the driver's seat.
[...]
'As Secretary Gates says, we're in the passenger seat. They're at the wheel,' Morrell continued. 'They determine the direction and the pace, but we're going to be their partner in this effort.'
[...]
'And are there any things in there that could jeopardize our operations or our nation's security?' he continued. 'We just don't know at this point.' |
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Name(s:) |
Geoff Morrell |
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Title: |
Press Secretary |
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Agency(ies): |
Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/WUE6Y |
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Title: |
Pentagon Launches Probe into Document Leaks |
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Author: |
Michael Carden |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Yesterday, I called FBI Director Robert Mueller and asked for the FBI's assistance in our investigation as a partner. It is important that we have all the resources we need to investigate and assess this breach of national security. Furthermore, the department is taking action in theater to prevent a repeat of such a breach, to include tightening procedures for accessing and transporting classified information. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/nhVsF |
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Title: |
Gates Calls on FBI to Join Leak Investigation |
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Author: |
Jim Garamone |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. I would first like to start with some comments about the release and subsequent publication of classified military documents earlier this week.
First, as the president stated, the problems identified and the issues raised in these documents relating to the war in Afghanistan have been well known in and out of government for some time. In fact, it was the recognition of many of these challenges that led to the president to conduct an extensive review of our Afghan strategy last year, which concluded that our mission there needed a fundamentally new approach.
These documents represent a mountain of raw data and individual impressions, most several years old, devoid of context or analysis. They do not represent official positions or policy. And they do not, in my view, fundamentally call into question the efficacy of our current strategy in Afghanistan and its prospects for success.
Having said all that, the battlefield consequences of the release of these documents are potentially severe and dangerous for our troops, our allies and Afghan partners, and may well damage our relationships and reputation in that key part of the world. Intelligence sources and methods, as well as military tactics, techniques and procedures, will become known to our adversaries.
This department is conducting a thorough, aggressive investigation to determine how this leak occurred, to identify the person or persons responsible, and to assess the content of the information compromised. We have a moral responsibility to do everything possible to mitigate the consequences for our troops and our partners downrange, especially those who have worked with and put their trust in us in the past, who now may be targeted for retribution.
Yesterday, I called FBI Director Robert Mueller and asked for the FBI's assistance in our investigation as a partner. It is important that we have all the resources we need to investigate and assess this breach of national security. Furthermore, the department is taking action in theater to prevent a repeat of such a breach, to include tightening procedures for accessing and transporting classified information.
As a general proposition, we endeavor to push access to sensitive battlefield information down to where it is most useful -- on the front lines -- where as a practical matter there are fewer restrictions and controls than at rear headquarters. In the wake of this incident, it will be a real challenge to strike the right balance between security and providing our frontline troops the information they need.
The U.S. military's success over the years rests on the abilities and integrity of its men and women in uniform and our trust in them. This trust is represented by the fact that, relative to other countries' armed forces, our military culture is one that on the battlefield places great responsibility on the shoulders of even junior servicemembers, to include entrusting them with sensitive information. The American way of war depends upon it.
But to earn and maintain that trust, we must all be responsible in handling, protecting and safeguarding our nation's secrets. For years there has been what I would call appropriate criticism of excessive classification and over-classification of information. However, this recent release of documents is a pointed reminder that much secret information is treated as such to protect sources of information, to protect the lives of our men and women in uniform, to deny our enemies the information about our military operations, and to preserve our relationships with friends and allies.
This recent massive breach should be a reminder to all entrusted with our secrets that there are potentially dramatic and grievously harmful consequences of violations of trust and responsibility. We will aggressively investigate and, wherever possible, prosecute such violations.
Chairman.
[...]
Q Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the investigation should go beyond the source or sources of the leak within the military to include those who received or used the information -- WikiLeaks, the news media? And does the presence of the FBI in the investigation indicate such a widening of its scope?
SEC. GATES: Obviously, in the middle of an investigation, and particularly one that is in the military justice system, there's very little that I can say because of the potential for command influence. My basic position, though, is the investigation should go wherever it needs to go. And one of the reasons that I asked the director of the FBI to partner with us in this is to ensure that it can go wherever it needs to go.
Q To include potentially beyond --
SEC. GATES: I'll just -- I'll just leave it at that.
Julian.
Q Sir, PFC Bradley Manning was charged earlier with another leak to WikiLeaks. Do you feel that there was not -- was there an aggressive enough effort to examine what he accessed that he was not supposed to access? Have you thoroughly looked at what documents he, who's already accused, might have looked at in addition to what he's already been charged with?
SEC. GATES: Well, obviously, what I just said in response to Anne's question goes here, too. I'm just not going to talk about any specific individual or the status of the investigation.
Q If I could try again, then, on a slightly different matter. Is there -- are you -- you mentioned that there would be some changes at the tactical level in Iraq. Are you concerned that -- is it a problem that the rules -- there were insufficient rules in place, or that rules were not followed to the letter that allowed breaches on the front line?
SEC. GATES: Well, again, the -- based on what I've been briefed on and what I knew before, as I said in my statement, if the kind of breach involved in the downloading of these thousands of documents had occurred at a rear headquarters or here in the U.S., very high likelihood we would have detected it.
But the interesting thing is -- and it really was one of the lessons learned from the first Gulf War in 1991 -- was how little useful intelligence information was being received by battalion and company commanders in the field. And so there has been an effort over the last 15 or so years in the military, and I would say really accelerated during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to push as much information as far forward as possible, which means putting it in a secret channel that almost everybody has access to in uniform, and obviously many civilians as well.
We want those soldiers in a forward operating base to have all the information they possibly can have that impacts on their own security, but also being able to accomplish their mission. And so one of the things that we are going to have to look at with General Petraeus, and soon General Austin, is what kind of -- should we change the way we approach that, or do we -- do we continue to take the risk?
And there are some technological solutions. Most of them are not immediately available to us. But figuring out if we need to change the balance I think is one of the issues that independent of the investigations that all of us are going to have to work on.
[...]
SEC. GATES: I would -- I would just add one other thing. The thing to remember here is that this is a huge amount of raw data, as I said at the outset of my remarks. There is no accountability. There is no sense of responsibility. It is sort of thrown out there for take as you will and damn the consequences.
Q With all due respect, you didn't answer the question.
Q Mr. Secretary, if I could just come back a minute, the fact is, the department -- the U.S. military knew weeks ago; it is part of the public record that tens of thousands of documents had been downloaded. Without referencing any particular legal matter, it has been in the public record released by this department. Charge sheets had been filed. The department, the military knew. So why the surprise? Why didn't the military move faster to assess this, to establish a team to assess it, to bring the FBI in? Charges were filed about tens of thousan |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/yYDfm |
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ADM. MULLEN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I certainly share your concerns about the recklessness with which classified documents were both leaked and then posted online.
As I said earlier this week, I am appalled by this behavior, and, frankly, outraged that anyone in their right mind would think it valuable to make public even one sensitive report, let alone tens of thousands of them, about a war that is being waged.
Yes, the documents are old and essentially raw inputs to our intelligence and operations apparatus. And yes, much of what has been revealed has already been commonly understood by the public or otherwise covered in the media. I can assure you, having just come from visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan, that none of what I've seen posted online or reported in the press affects our overarching strategy. But, frankly, that's not why this is so destructive. The sheer size and scope of the collection now demands a careful review to determine the degree to which future tactical operations may be impacted, and the degree to which the lives of our troops and Afghan partners may be at risk. And I think we always need to be mindful of the unknown potential for damage in any particular document that we handle.
Mr. Assange can say whatever he likes about the greater good he thinks he and his source are doing, but the truth is they might already have on their hands the blood of some young soldier or that of an Afghan family. Disagree with the war all you want, take issue with the policy, challenge me or our ground commanders on the decisions we make to accomplish the mission we've been given, but don't put those who willingly go into harm's way even further in harm's way just to satisfy your need to make a point.
And while I'm at it, let me make one: A big part of my trip -- indeed, a big part of my time as chairman -- has revolved around building and sustaining relationships. Everywhere I went over the last 10 days, those relationships were front and center -- not just for me, but for our commanders and for our diplomats.
I saw it in Kabul, where Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus have forged a strong team and an even stronger dialogue with the Karzai administration.
I saw it in Kandahar city, where I met with a company of U.S. MPs living and working side by side with Afghan police at a security station near the outskirts of town.
I saw it in Islamabad in yet another of my engagements with General Kayani. He spent an entire afternoon flying me to northern Pakistan so I could see for myself some of the rugged terrain he and his troops have to patrol.
If we've learned nothing else in fighting these wars, it's that relationships matter. They are vital. We are not going to kill our way to success, and we sure aren't going to achieve success alone. So in addition to making sure we understand the tactical risks from these leaks, I think it's incumbent upon us not to let the good relations -- relationships we've established and the trust we've worked so hard to build throughout the region also become a casualty.
Thank you.
[...]
ADM. MULLEN: Let me take this.
SEC. GATES: Yeah, yeah.
ADM. MULLEN: Can I just add -- make one additional comment to that, is in that change, what it has done is it has put -- pushed -- put us in a position to much better match the enemy in terms of speed of war. It's integrated intelligence more rapidly into operations, which then generates more intelligence, which allows us to operate much more effectively. And I think, obviously, as the secretary said, we're going to have to take a look at what this investigation tells us and make sure that we have the balance exactly right.
Q Admiral Mullen, you have mentioned that the founder of WikiLeaks may have blood on his hands. Do you know, have people been killed over this information?
ADM. MULLEN: They're still -- what I am concerned about with this is I think individuals who are not involved in this kind of warfare and expose this kind of information can't -- from my perspective, can't appreciate how this kind of information is routinely networked together inside the classified channels we use specifically.
And it's very difficult, if you don't do this and understand this, to understand the impact, and very specifically the potential that is there -- that is there to risk lives of our soldiers and sailors, airmen and Marines, coalition warfighters, as well -- as well as Afghan citizens. And there's no doubt in my mind about that.
Q What --
[...]
ADM. MULLEN: I think the heart of your question goes to the ISI. And specifically -- and I've said before and would repeat that it's an organization that, actually, we have, in ways, a very positive relationship, very healthy relationship between our intelligence organizations.
And there have been -- that said, there have been elements of the ISI that have got relationships -- a relationship with extremist organizations, and that we -- you know, I, we, consider that unacceptable. In the long run, I think that the ISI has to strategically shift its -- tied in great part to what the secretary's laid out -- focused on its view of its own national-security interests.
These are issues that -- and I have seen some of this; I was just with General Kayani again, and this is a subject we frequently discuss. And they have, as the secretary said, in that country, captured lots of terrorists, killed lots of terrorists, focused on terrorism. And they are strategically shifting.
That doesn't mean that they are through that shift at all, and they do still -- they are still focused on rebuilding this trust as well, and it is not yet rebuilt. |
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Name(s:) |
Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Chair |
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Agency(ies): |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/yYDfm |
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Title: |
WikiLeaks Release of Classified War Documents, Jul 29, 2010 |
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Author: |
Robert Gates, Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense, Chair |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Title: |
DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon |
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Author: |
Robert Gates, Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Chair |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Gates Calls on FBI to Join Leak Investigation |
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Author: |
Jim Garamone |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, U.S. Navy, conduct a joint press conference in the Pentagon on July 29, 2010. The leak of many thousands of classified documents on the WikiLeaks website was the chief topic under discussion. DoD photo by R. D. Ward. (Released) |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Audio Press Release |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Public Affairs, Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Biden: Pakistani Support for Taliban 'In the Past' |
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Author: |
Lisa Daniel |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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It's absolutely false that WikiLeaks contacted the White House and offered to have them look through the documents,' Marine Corps Col. David Lapan said. |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/Ekp6s |
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Title: |
Official Rejects Claim WikiLeaks Offered Document Review |
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Author: |
Michael Carden |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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MR. MORRELL: Hi, guys, good afternoon. I have a brief opening statement, and then we'll get to questions.
On Monday -- pardon me -- Tuesday, it was reported that WikiLeaks has asked the Department of Defense for help in reviewing approximately 15,000 classified documents that WikiLeaks obtained in an unauthorized and inappropriate manner, before WikiLeaks releases those classified documents to the public.
WikiLeaks has made no such request directly to the Department of Defense. These documents are the property of the U.S. government and contain classified and sensitive information.
The Defense Department demands that WikiLeaks return immediately to the U.S. government all versions of documents obtained directly or indirectly from the Department of Defense databases or records.
WikiLeaks's public disclosure last week of a large number of our documents has already threatened the safety of our troops, our allies and Afghan citizens who are working with us to help bring about peace and stability in that part of the world.
Public disclosure of additional Defense Department classified information can only make the damage worse. The only acceptable course is for WikiLeaks to take steps immediately to return all versions of all of these documents to the U.S. government and permanently delete them from its website, computers and records.
A final note. WikiLeaks's web page constitutes a brazen solicitation to U.S. government officials, including our military, to break the law. WikiLeaks's public assertion that submitting confidential material to WikiLeaks is safe, easy and protected by law is materially false and misleading.
The Department of Defense therefore also demands that WikiLeaks discontinue any solicitation of this type.
[...]
Anne.
Q Two things on that. Do you have any mechanism or authority to compel WikiLeaks to do as you say -- as you are demanding? And do you now consider Private Manning the prime suspect in your -- in the WikiLeaks leak?
MR. MORRELL: To the second part first, I think we have described Private Manning -- who is charged with leaking other classified information to this same organization -- as a person of interest. I know of no update to his status since our initial description of him as such.
With regards to the first part of your question, which gets to, beyond our demand, how do we intend to compel, what I would say there, Anne, is that at this point we are making a demand of them. We are asking them to do the right thing. This is the appropriate course of action, given the damage that has already been done, and we hope they will honor our demands and comply with our demands.
We will cross the next bridge when we come to it. If it requires them compelling to do anything -- if doing the right thing is not good enough for them, then we will figure out what other alternatives we have to compel them to do the right thing. Let me leave it at that.
[...]
Daphne.
Q Well, as far as -- could it be -- could it involve legal action, as the next step?
MR. MORRELL: Well, I don't want to speculate as to what it could involve. Obviously, this is a matter that has gotten the attention not just of this department, but of the entire United States government. As we've talked about before, the secretary of Defense brought the FBI into this investigation very early on. The Department of Justice is also involved in this matter.
So those are two entities which have the authority, the wherewithal, should they choose to approach this through the legal system.
That is not what we -- what I am announcing here. What I am announcing here is a request, a demand of WikiLeaks, the organization, to do the right thing and to not further exacerbate the damage that has been done by them to date and return to us all the information that was illegally passed to them and to expunge it from their website and all their records.
[...]
Yeah, Craig.
Q Has DOD analyzed these 15,000 outstanding records and come to any conclusion on -- of how harmful it might be for them to be released?
MR. MORRELL: Well, obviously these 15,000 documents, which they claim to be withholding as part of a harm-minimization exercise, are not in our possession. We don't know for sure which 1,500 [sic; 15,000] documents they are referring to. We have some ideas and are doing some proactive work, some prophylactic work in the event that the documents we suspect they could be are indeed the documents that they are threatening to post. But that's where I'll leave it now.
[...]
Yeah, Tom.
Q Has there been any further discussion or even decisions on changing or tightening security rules in the field? The secretary has acknowledged it's important to have access to this information at the unit level, but clearly there are challenges and risks as well.
MR. MORRELL: Yeah, I mean, I think he addressed this last week, Tom, when he was asked about it when this first broke. I think fundamentally, as he said to you a few weeks ago, even before this most recent disclosure, he fundamentally still believes that one of the things that makes our military the envy of the world is that we instill an incredible degree of trust and responsibility in our most junior officers and our most junior enlisted, so that this organization is not top-heavy, it's effective from top to bottom.
And I think as troubling as this episode is, and again we don't know who is responsible for leaking this information -- as troubling as it is, I think he does not want to do anything to jeopardize the fundamental goodness of this trusting relationship that has existed for decades in the United States military.
That said, this is a problem. The fact that information like this gets out into the public domain is a serious breach. And we are taking measures internally to reinforce existing rules and guidelines and to make sure that people are aware of those rules and guidelines and are being even more vigilant about enforcing the existing rules and guidelines.
[...]
Yeah, Jeff.
Q You have called on WikiLeaks to do the right thing. By your standards, they haven't done the right thing so far. What makes you think they'll suddenly have a change of heart?
MR. MORRELL: I don't know that we're very confident they'll have a change of heart. They've shown no indication thus far that they appreciate the gravity, the seriousness of the situation they have caused -- the lives they have endangered, the operations they have potentially undermined, the innocent people who have potentially been put in harm's way as a result.
So I don't know that we have a high degree of confidence that this -- that this request, this demand unto itself will prevail upon them.
We certainly are hopeful of that being the case. But you know, I don't know what to expect of this organization. We've heard so many different things from so many different people purporting to represent them, I don't know what's the truth.
You know, they claimed initially to have, you know, reviewed these documents. Then we learn afterwards, they've only looked at 2,000 of them, so they don't really know what's in all of them. They claim to have reached out to -- you know, to the United States government to assist in -- you know, for assistance in harm minimization. Then we find out, no, it was through their partner, The New York Times. I don't know The New York Times would describe themselves as their partner.
There is -- there have been a lot of contradictory and conflicting statements along the way, which certainly cause us to question their motivation, their intent, their credibility.
This is an opportunity, it seems to me, for t |
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Name(s:) |
Geoff Morrell |
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Title: |
Press Secretary |
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Agency(ies): |
Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/kbmlP |
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Title: |
DOD News Briefing with Geoff Morrell from the Pentagon |
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Author: |
Geoff Morrell |
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Title: |
Press Secretary |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Defense Department Daily Briefing, August 5, 2010 |
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Author: |
Geoff Morrell |
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Title: |
Press Secretary |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Pentagon Demands WikiLeaks Return Stolen Documents |
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Author: |
Elaine Wilson |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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The sailors also wanted the straight talk on the WikiLeaks situation. Gates said the illegal release and posting of classified documents on the website poses 'very serious consequences.' The documents contain the names of many Afghans who have helped the coalition and they contain a huge amount of information showing the tactics, techniques and procedures used by coalition forces.
'We know from intelligence that both the Taliban and al-Qaida have given direction to comb those documents for information, so I think the consequences are potentially very severe,' he said. |
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Name(s:) |
Jim Garamone |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/YPojM |
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WASHINGTON, Aug. 18, 2010 Defense Department officials today released a letter the Pentagon's top lawyer sent to a man purported to be an attorney for the WikiLeaks website, which published tens of thousands of classified documents last month and is threatening to release 15,000 more.
Pentagon spokesman Bryan Whitman told reporters this afternoon that Timothy J. Matusheski was a 'no show' for a telephone call that was arranged last week when his name and purported status as a WikiLeaks attorney came up in an investigation of the document leak.
The following day, Whitman said, the Pentagon's general counsel codified the Defense Department's position in a letter and sent it to Matusheski.
Here is the text of the letter, dated Aug. 16 [2010] and signed by General Counsel Jeh C. Johnson. Words that were underlined in the original are presented here in all capital letters:
Dear Mr. Matusheski
I understand that you represent yourself to be an attorney for WikiLeaks and that you, on behalf of that organization, sought a conversation with someone in the United States Government to discuss 'harm minimization' with respect to some 15,000 U.S. Government classified documents that WikiLeaks is holding and is threatening to make public. In response, I was prepared to speak with you yesterday at 10:00am EDT and convey the position of the Department of Defense. Despite your agreement to be available by telephone yesterday morning, we could not reach you at that time.
The position of the Department of Defense is clear, and it should be conveyed to your client in no uncertain terms:
WikiLeaks is holding the property of the U.S. Government, including classified documents and sensitive national security information that has not been authorized for release. Further, it is the view of the Department of Defense that WikiLeaks obtained this material in circumstances that constitute a violation of United States law, and that as long as WikiLeaks holds this material, the violation of the law is ongoing.
The Secretary of Defense has made clear the damage to our national security by the public release by WikiLeaks of some 76,000 classified documents several weeks ago, and the threat to the lives of coalition forces in Afghanistan and to the lives of local Afghan nationals as a result. As the Secretary has also stated, we know from various sources that our enemy is accessing the WikiLeaks website for the purpose of exploiting WikiLeaks' illegal and irresponsible actions, to pursue their own terrorist aims.
The threatened release of additional classified documents by WikiLeaks will add to the damage. Among other sensitive items, we believe the classified documents contain, like the first batch of released documents, the names of Afghan nationals who are assisting coalition forces in our efforts to bring about peace and stability in that portion of the world.
Thus, the Department of Defense will NOT negotiate some 'minimized' or 'sanitized' version of a release by WikiLeaks of additional U.S. Government classified documents. The Department demands that NOTHING further be released by WikiLeaks, that ALL of the U.S. Government classified documents that WikiLeaks has obtained be returned immediately, and that WikiLeaks remove and destroy all of these records from its databases.
(Signed)
Jeh Charles Johnson |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/IpLJW |
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Title: |
Defense.gov Names Top Stories of 2010 |
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Author: |
Jennifer Cragg |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Emerging Media, Defense Media Activity |
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Notes: |
The Department of Defense links to this press release again on December 21, 2010 in a press release titled, 'Defense.gov Names Top Stories of 2010' |
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Archive Link |
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Pentagon spokesman Marine Corps Col. Dave Lapan said the department does not know for sure what Wikileaks will publish, but officials expect the same type of documents the organization put on the Internet in July about the Afghan conflict.
[...]
The potential breach is dangerous, but not fatal, Lapan said, noting neither the Iraq, nor Afghanistan data bases contain intelligence sources and methods. |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/b8rMM |
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That said, the period covered by these reports has been well-chronicled in news stories, books and films and the release of these field reports does not bring new understanding to Iraq's past,' Morrell added. |
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Name(s:) |
Geoff Morrell |
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Title: |
Press Secretary |
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Agency(ies): |
Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/b8rMM |
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A DOD task force has been combing through the Iraq data base to assess the damage that a proposed WikiLeaks publication of 400,000 significant activity reports could pose to the U.S. military, Iraqi allies, and on-going operations. |
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Name(s:) |
Jim Garamone |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
Defense Intelligence Agency Information Review Task Force, DIA, IRTF |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/b8rMM |
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WikiLeaks full public release on its website of 400,000 classified military documents from Iraq war operations is shameful, the Pentagon press secretary said tonight.
[...]
'This is an extraordinary disservice to America's men and women in uniform,' Geoff Morrell said.
[...]
More than 150,000 forces in Iraq and Afghanistan are already in considerable danger, he said. 'That danger is now exponentially multiplied as a result of this leak because it gives our enemies the wherewithal to look for vulnerabilities in how we operate and to exploit those opportunities and potentially kill our forces. That is just shameful.'
[...]
'Potentially what one could mine from a huge data base like this are vulnerabilities in terms of how we operate, our tactics, our techniques, our procedures, the capabilities of our equipment, how we respond in combat situations, response times -- indeed how we cultivate sources,' Morrell said. 'All of that, [given the] thinking and adaptive enemy we've been facing in Iraq and Afghanistan, can be used against us.'
[...]
U.S. intelligence reports and Taliban public statements indicate that enemy forces have been mining the released Afghan data base for operational vulnerabilities, Morrell said. |
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Name(s:) |
Geoff Morrell |
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Title: |
Press Secretary |
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Agency(ies): |
Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/6CpEX |
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A DOD task force has been combing through the Iraq data base to assess the damage that the WikiLeaks publication of the activity reports could pose to the U.S. military, Iraqi allies and on-going operations. |
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Name(s:) |
Jim Garamone |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/6CpEX |
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We anticipate the release of what are claimed to be several hundred thousand classified State department cables on Sunday night that detail private diplomatic discussions with foreign governments. By its very nature, field reporting to Washington is candid and often incomplete information. It is not an expression of policy, nor does it always shape final policy decisions. Nevertheless, these cables could compromise private discussions with foreign governments and opposition leaders, and when the substance of private conversations is printed on the front pages of newspapers across the world, it can deeply impact not only US foreign policy interests, but those of our allies and friends around the world. To be clear -- such disclosures put at risk our diplomats, intelligence professionals, and people around the world who come to the United States for assistance in promoting democracy and open government. These documents also may include named individuals who in many cases live and work under oppressive regimes and who are trying to create more open and free societies. President Obama supports responsible, accountable, and open government at home and around the world, but this reckless and dangerous action runs counter to that goal. By releasing stolen and classified documents, Wikileaks has put at risk not only the cause of human rights but also the lives and work of these individuals. We condemn in the strongest terms the unauthorized disclosure of classified documents and sensitive national security information. |
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Agency(ies): |
Office of the Press Secretary, White House |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/ZPWjw |
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Title: |
Officials Condemn Leaks, Detail Prevention Efforts |
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Author: |
Jim Garamone |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, good afternoon. Do we have enough room in here? I want to take a moment to discuss the recent news reports of classified documents that were illegally provided from United States Government computers. In my conversations with counterparts from around the world over the past few days, and in my meeting earlier today with Foreign Minister Davutoglu of Turkey, I have had very productive discussions on this issue.
The United States strongly condemns the illegal disclosure of classified information. It puts people's lives in danger, threatens our national security, and undermines our efforts to work with other countries to solve shared problems. This Administration is advancing a robust foreign policy that is focused on advancing America's national interests and leading the world in solving the most complex challenges of our time, from fixing the global economy, to thwarting international terrorism, to stopping the spread of catastrophic weapons, to advancing human rights and universal values. In every country and in every region of the world, we are working with partners to pursue these aims.
So let's be clear: this disclosure is not just an attack on America's foreign policy interests. It is an attack on the international community the alliances and partnerships, the conversations and negotiations, that safeguard global security and advance economic prosperity.
I am confident that the partnerships that the Obama Administration has worked so hard to build will withstand this challenge. The President and I have made these partnerships a priority and we are proud of the progress that they have helped achieve and they will remain at the center of our efforts.
I will not comment on or confirm what are alleged to be stolen State Department cables. But I can say that the United States deeply regrets the disclosure of any information that was intended to be confidential, including private discussions between counterparts or our diplomats' personal assessments and observations. I want to make clear that our official foreign policy is not set through these messages, but here in Washington. Our policy is a matter of public record, as reflected in our statements and our actions around the world.
I would also add that to the American people and to our friends and partners, I want you to know that we are taking aggressive steps to hold responsible those who stole this information. I have directed that specific actions be taken at the State Department, in addition to new security safeguards at the Department of Defense and elsewhere to protect State Department information so that this kind of breach cannot and does not ever happen again.
Relations between governments aren't the only concern created by the publication of this material. U.S. diplomats meet with local human rights workers, journalists, religious leaders, and others outside of governments who offer their own candid insights. These conversations also depend on trust and confidence. For example, if an anti-corruption activist shares information about official misconduct, or a social worker passes along documentation of sexual violence, revealing that person's identity could have serious repercussions: imprisonment, torture, even death.
So whatever are the motives in disseminating these documents, it is clear that releasing them poses real risks to real people, and often to the very people who have dedicated their own lives to protecting others.
Now, I am aware that some may mistakenly applaud those responsible, so I want to set the record straight: There is nothing laudable about endangering innocent people, and there is nothing brave about sabotaging the peaceful relations between nations on which our common security depends.
There have been examples in history in which official conduct has been made public in the name of exposing wrongdoings or misdeeds. This is not one of those cases. In contrast, what is being put on display in this cache of documents is the fact that American diplomats are doing the work we expect them to do. They are helping identify and prevent conflicts before they start. They are working hard every day to solve serious practical problems to secure dangerous materials, to fight international crime, to assist human rights defenders, to restore our alliances, to ensure global economic stability. This is the role that America plays in the world. This is the role our diplomats play in serving America. And it should make every one of us proud.
The work of our diplomats doesn't just benefit Americans, but also billions of others around the globe. In addition to endangering particular individuals, disclosures like these tear at the fabric of the proper function of responsible government.
People of good faith understand the need for sensitive diplomatic communications, both to protect the national interest and the global common interest. Every country, including the United States, must be able to have candid conversations about the people and nations with whom they deal. And every country, including the United States, must be able to have honest, private dialogue with other countries about issues of common concern. I know that diplomats around the world share this view but this is not unique to diplomacy. In almost every profession whether it's law or journalism, finance or medicine or academia or running a small business people rely on confidential communications to do their jobs. We count on the space of trust that confidentiality provides. When someone breaches that trust, we are all worse off for it. And so despite some of the rhetoric we've heard these past few days, confidential communications do not run counter to the public interest. They are fundamental to our ability to serve the public interest.
In America, we welcome genuine debates about pressing questions of public policy. We have elections about them. That is one of the greatest strengths of our democracy. It is part of who we are and it is a priority for this Administration. But stealing confidential documents and then releasing them without regard for the consequences does not serve the public good, and it is not the way to engage in a healthy debate.
In the past few days, I have spoken with many of my counterparts around the world, and we have all agreed that we will continue to focus on the issues and tasks at hand. In that spirit, President Obama and I remain committed to productive cooperation with our partners as we seek to build a better, more prosperous world for all.
Thank you, and I'd be glad to take a few questions.
MR. CROWLEY: We'll begin with Charlie Wolfson of CBS in his last week here covering the State Department.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Where are you going, Charlie?
QUESTION: I'll (inaudible) into the sunset, but let me get to a question.
SECRETARY CLINTON: Yes, sir. (Laughter.)
QUESTION: Madam Secretary, are you embarrassed by these leaks personally, professionally? And what harm have the leaks done to the U.S. so far that you can determine from talking to your colleagues?
SECRETARY CLINTON: Well, Charlie, as I said in my statement, and based on the many conversations that I've had with my counterparts, I am confident that the partnerships and relationships that we have built in this Administration will withstand this challenge. The President and I have made these partnerships a priority, a real centerpiece of our foreign policy, and we're proud of the progress that we have made over the last 22 months.
Every single day, U.S. Government representatives from the entire government, not just from the State Department, engage with hundreds if not thousands of government representatives and members of civil society from around the world. They carry out the goals and the interests and the values of the United States. And it is imperative that we have candid reporting from those who are in the field working with their counterparts in order to inform our decision-making back here in Washington.
I can tell you that in my conversations, at least one of my counterparts said to me, 'Well, don't worry about it. You should see what we say about you.' (Laughter.) So I think that t |
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Name(s:) |
Hillary Clinton |
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Title: |
Secretary of State |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of State |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/Ro0gP |
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Title: |
State Department Briefing, Nov 29, 2010 |
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Author: |
Hillary Clinton |
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Title: |
Secretary of State |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Department of State |
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Concerning: |
"Cablegate |
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Title: |
Clinton: WikiLeaks' Release Attacks International Community |
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Author: |
Jim Garamone, Lisa Daniel |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Mullen Meets With Pakistanis to Align Interests, Goals |
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Author: |
Jim Garamone |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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We consider this reporting from posts around the world to be one of our most valuable contributions to every facet of national security, and we share this diplomatic reporting through automatic dissemination to over 65 agencies based on profiled requirements these agencies provide to the Department. Recent events have not changed our commitment to sharing this vital information.
WikiLeaks Disclosures and State Department Mitigation Actions
July 2010
When DoD material was leaked in July 2010, we worked with DoD to identify any alleged State Department material that was in WikiLeaks' possession. We immediately asked Chiefs of Mission at affected posts to review any purported State material in the release and provide an assessment, as well as a summary of the overall effect the WikiLeaks release could have on relations with the host country.
Following the completion of the review in August, when it was believed that purported State cables might be released, the State Department instructed all Chiefs of Missions to familiarize themselves with the content in the Net Centric Diplomacy (NCD) database should a release actually occur.
[_]
November 2010
When the press and WikiLeaks announced that they were going to release purported State cables starting on November 28, 2010, the State Department took the following immediate actions: 1) Established a 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group composed of senior officials from throughout the Department, notably our regional bureaus; 2) Created a group to review potential risks to individuals; and 3) Suspended SIPRNet access to NCD (SIPRNet is a DOD network).
The Department also created a Mitigation Team to address the policy, legal, security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the release of these documents. During this period, the Department kept Congress apprised of both the international fallout caused by the WikiLeaks' disclosure and the steps undertaken to mitigate them. The Department convened two separate briefings for members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate within days (December 2, 2010) of the first disclosure by WikiLeaks and appeared twice before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (December 7 and 9, 2010).
[_]
Ongoing Mitigation Efforts
State continues its thorough review of policies and procedures related to information security to ensure that they fully meet the current challenges. Efforts are being coordinated throughout the Department, as well as with the interagency, to ensure that we share classified information in an effective and secure manner with those who need it in their work to advance our national security.
While the Department already had strong safeguards in place, we have further enhanced and updated our computer security policies that prohibit the downloading of classified information to removable media (e.g., thumb drives, CDs/DVDs) on the Department's classified network. The Department continues to deploy an automated tool that audits and monitors the Department's classified network to detect anomalies that would not otherwise be apparent. This capability is backed up by professional staff who promptly analyze detected anomalies to ensure that they do not represent threats to the system.
The NCD database of diplomatic reporting and the State Department's classified web sites, although now inaccessible through SIPRNet, remains available via the more limited distribution Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). Throughout, the State Department has continued to share its diplomatic reporting among federal agencies through its traditional system of cable dissemination.
To heighten awareness of what is and is not permitted when working on the Department's classified network and on classified systems, user awareness reminders are now available for Department employees on its classified network, in addition to the standard in-person briefings about handling classified material and a soon-to-be-released computer-based course on identifying and marking classified and sensitive information.
In addition, the Department is exploring solutions to improve how we share and protect information with those who are not direct recipients of our telegrams. One such solution would involve the creation of a website with a searchable database that would allow appropriately cleared personnel to use key word searches to discover relevant State cables; the search would reveal cable metadata, such as the subject line, but would not provide the full text of the cables in a potentially vulnerable database. This would ensure that cleared personnel are aware of cables they have an operational or strategic need to see. Cleared personnel from other agencies would then be able to seek cables necessary for their work functions through their own organization's internal distribution system. The responsibility will be on the receiving, not the originating, agency to disseminate information to its internal personnel.
The Department has continued to work with the interagency on information management issues by participating in meetings of the new Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) chaired by the Special Advisor for Information Access and Security policy as well as existing IPCs such as the Information Sharing and Access IPC. |
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Name(s:) |
Patrick Kennedy |
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Title: |
Under Secretary for Management |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of State |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/OfVrA |
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On August 12, 2010, immediately following the first release of documents, the Secretary of Defense commissioned two internal DoD studies. The first study, led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), directed a review of DoD information security policy. The second study, led by the Joint Staff, focused on procedures for handling classified information in forward deployed areas. The Secretary also tasked the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to stand up an Information Review Task Force to assess, in concert with interagency participants, the substance of the data disclosed.
Results of the two studies revealed a number of findings, including the following:
Forward deployed units maintained an over-reliance on removable electronic storage media. Roles and responsibilities for detecting and dealing with an insider threat must be better defined. Processes for reporting security incidents need improvement. Limited capability currently exists to detect and monitor anomalous behavior on classified computer networks.
Once the studies were concluded and the results reported to the Secretary, the Department began working to address the findings and improve its overall security posture to mitigate the possibility of another similar type of disclosure. Some of this work was already planned or underway. For other findings, like the issue of removable media, new initiatives had to be immediately implemented. |
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Name(s:) |
Teresa Takai, Thomas Ferguson |
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Title: |
Chief Information Officer, Principal Deputy Undersecretary |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/OfVrA |
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As the IC Information Sharing Executive (IC ISE), my main focus today concerns classified information - and, in particular, information that is derived from intelligence sources and menthols, or information that is reflected in the analytic judgements and assessments that the IC produces. I want to be clear, though, that our concern for the protection of information is not restricted to the fragility of sources and methods, but extends as well to broader aspects of national security. We recognize, and will hear today, that the Departments of State and Defense, as well as other federal agencies, themselves originate classified national security information that is vital to the protection of our nation and conduct of our foreign relations,a and this information, widely distributed, and used throughout the government to achieve these objectives. As we have seen recently, the unauthorized disclosure of any form of classified national security information has serious implications for the policy and operational aspects of national security. |
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Name(s:) |
Corin Stone |
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Title: |
Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive |
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Agency(ies): |
Office of the Director of National Intelligence |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/OfVrA |
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In the five years since Congress directed the creation of the Information Sharing environment, significant steps have been taken towards establishing a string foundations. Important mission initiatives, such as the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, and core capabilities and enablers, such as the National Network of Fusion Centers and the National Information Exchange Model, have produced results and show ongoing promise_
The WikiLeaks breach is not principally an information sharing problem; at its root a bad actor allegedly violated the trust placed in him. |
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Name(s:) |
Paul Kshemendra |
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Title: |
Program Manager for the Information Environment |
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Agency(ies): |
Office of the Director of National Intelligence |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/OfVrA |
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Takai told Senate members that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates immediately called for two internal studies to review the department's information security policy and to unveil how classified information is handled in forward-deployed areas. The results showed that forward-deployed units had an 'over-reliance' on using removable electronic storage media, Takai said. |
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Name(s:) |
Terri Moon Crunk |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/4DMyk |
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Title: |
Information Sharing and WikiLeaks |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
C-SPAN |
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Title: |
Information Sharing in the Era of WikiLeaks: Balancing Security and Collaboration |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Congressional Record |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Government Printing Office |
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Title: |
Congressional Record |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Government Printing Office |
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Title: |
Congressional Record |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Government Printing Office |
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The spectrum of threats includes espionage, cyber intrusions, organized crime and the unauthorized disclosure of sensitive and classified US Government information, a notable recent example being the unlawful release of classified US documents by WikiLeaks. While the impacts of the WikiLeaks disclosures are still being assessed, we are moving aggressively to respond by protecting our information networks with improved CI analysis of audit and access controls, improving our ability to detect and respond to insider threats - while balancing the need to share information - and increase awareness across the US Government to the persistent and wide-ranging nature of foreign intelligence threats. |
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Name(s:) |
James Clapper |
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Title: |
Director of National Intelligence |
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Agency(ies): |
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Senator MCCAIN [...] How serious is the damage to your capability to carrying out
your responsibilities was the WikiLeaks situation?
Mr. CLAPPER. Well, from my standpoint, it was quite damaging
because of the chilling effect it has on people who are willing to be
recruited and to provide information to us. And so, that's
Senator MCCAIN. So, it was a lot more than just embarrassing
to diplomats who
Mr. CLAPPER. Yes, sir.
Senator MCCAINwere candid in their assessments?
Mr. CLAPPER. And bear in mind, there are some potentially
700,000 documents out, that are out there, and there have only
been about 5,000 publicly revealed, so this could go on for quite
some time as these revelations are stretched out.
Senator MCCAIN. And it literally puts people's lives in danger
who were cooperating with us, whose names, identities may be revealed in these leaks, is that correct?
Mr. CLAPPER. That's possible. But I, frankly, am more concerned
about the ones we don't, we won't get in the future, that we can't
count, who won't engage with us because of fear of revelation.
Senator MCCAIN. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I bring that up because I'm intrigued by this debate that seems to go on that, well,
it's, we needed to know what our diplomats were saying to each
other, and we needed these candidthat's not what this is all
about is it?
Mr. CLAPPER. Well, the embarrassment factor, it makes for juicy
headlines and all that sort of thing. But that's not really what the
serious impact is. And of course, this wholeI should, not to dismiss that. That also is a negative effect of, the candor involved in
diplomatic discourse, diplomatic exchanges, I think will be affected.
I think, so farand certainly the dialogue I've had with foreign
interlocutors, while they're not happy about it, I think they see
that there is a larger interest here in a continued relationship with
the United Statesbut from an intelligence perspective, there's
been some damage. |
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Name(s:) |
James Clapper |
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Title: |
Director of National Intelligence |
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Agency(ies): |
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, ODNI |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Title: |
Congressional Record |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Government Printing Office |
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Title: |
Statement for the Record on the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Communities for the Senate Committee on Armed Services |
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Author: |
James Clapper |
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Title: |
Director of National Intelligence |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Office of the Director of National Intelligence |
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Title: |
World Wide Threat Assessment: Statement before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, 10 March 2011 |
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Classification: |
Unclassified |
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Author: |
Ronald Burgess |
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Title: |
Director |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Defense Intelligence Agency, DIA, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
United States Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing Webcast |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Senate Armed Services Committee |
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Title: |
Intelligence Chiefs Cite Greatest Security Threats |
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Author: |
Terri Moon Cronk |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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Name(s:) |
Donna Miles |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/NLbDp |
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Title: |
Pentagon Official Addresses WikiLeaks, Social Media |
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Author: |
Donna Miles |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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MR. JOHNSON: My name is Jeh Johnson. I am the general counsel of the Department of Defense. We are here today to provide an update on the status of Army Private First Class Bradley Manning.
The Army is transferring Private Manning from the pre-trial confinement facility at Quantico to the new Joint Regional Correctional Facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. With me to answer questions about this matter are the Under Secretary of the Army, Joe Westphal, and Lieutenant Colonel Dawn Hilton, who is the commander of the Fort Leavenworth facility.
Before we take your questions, I want to spend a moment to explain the circumstances. At the request of Private Manning's defense counsel, an assessment is under way to determine whether Private Manning is mentally competent in this case in the event it goes to trial. On Saturday, April 9, the inquiry phase of that process, known in military justice terms as a 706 board, was completed, and Private Manning's presence in the Washington, D.C. area is no longer necessary for that purpose.
However, we are told that the medical opinion concerning Private Manning's competence to stand trial may take additional time. At this juncture of the case, we have decided that the new joint-regional correctional facility at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is the most appropriate facility for Private Manning for continued pre-trial detention.
Army Corrections Command has reviewed the new facility and determined that it has the expertise and capability to provide continued long-term pre-trial confinement for Private Manning. The facility, which opened in October and opened a pre-trial confinement capability in January, is a state-of-the-art complex with the best and widest range of support services available to pre-trial prisoners within the Department of Defense corrections system, to include resident medical and mental-health care staff.
This facility is appropriate to meet Private Manning's health and welfare needs, given the possibility that he will remain in pre-trial confinement for an additional time during the 706 board process and the likelihood that the pre-trial phase of the case may continue for months beyond that. Colonel Hilton will be happy to answer questions about the facility. And I believe you have a fact sheet that provides some additional detail.
Within appropriate limits that must be established by the command of the facility, the Army will make the pre-trial facility at Fort Leavenworth available to a tour by a limited number of the press. It is also the case, like it was at Quantico, that Private Manning may receive a limited number of outside visitors, provided that Private Manning himself, as well as the command agrees that he can see them.
Private Manning will return to the Washington, D.C. area as needed for legal proceedings, as his case remains under the jurisdiction of the U.S. Army's military district of Washington.
It is important to remember that while Private Manning is charged with very serious offenses involving classified information and national security, in our system of military justice, as in our system of civilian justice in this country, he is presumed innocent until proven guilty. Pre-trial confinement, however, is common to both systems and has been determined to be appropriate in this case.
One final note. Many will be tempted to interpret today's action as a criticism of the pre-trial facility at Quantico. That is not the case. We remain satisfied that Private Manning's pre-trial confinement at Quantico was in compliance with legal and regulatory standards in all respects, and we salute the military personnel there for the job they did in difficult circumstances.
At this juncture of the case, given the likely continued period of pre-trial confinement, we have determined that the new pre-trial facility at Fort Leavenworth is the most appropriate one for Private Manning going forward.
We're now happy to answer your questions. Yes, ma'am.
Q: Sir, you said that there could be criticism or that there could be interpretations that this -- the pre-trial confinement was inappropriate, but that everything was followed by the letter of the law. At any point, do you think -- in your judgment, do you think that Private Manning, there was bad judgment used in the way that he was treated at Quantico; despite the fact whether it was by the letter of the law, that people who were running the facility at Quantico used bad judgment in the way he was treated?
MR. JOHNSON: No, I do not believe that.
I also know that I am the lawyer for the Department of Defense. I am not a corrections expert, and so I hesitate to second guess any of the judgments made by the personnel there in dealing with this particular confinee.
Q: Colonel Hilton, could I -- could I ask you if -- I mean, what is your assessment based on what you've --
LT. COL. HILTON: I don't know the specific details of Pfc. Manning's confinement. But what I do -- what I can tell you is that when he's transported to the Joint Regional Correctional Facility, he will receive -- will receive support from an experienced, trained professional staff that have been doing this for well over 20 years, and he'll receive the mental health, physical health and emotional health that he needs to go through this judicial process.
Q: When will he be transferred?
MR. JOHNSON: It's imminent. We don't normally provide precise details of the timing of such things, but it's imminent in the short term.
Q: This week?
LT. COL. HILTON: As a matter of policy, we don't discuss escort details. Though we don't discuss the details, we do this on a routine basis. This is what we do on a daily basis. When we perform these missions, they are very similar to the way the U.S. Marshals perform escorts, as well as other state and federal agencies. So this is what we do on a daily basis, and it will be formed --
MR. JOHNSON: I think you can assume that we would not be announcing this this far -- very far in advance.
Q: Wait, since this is -- I mean, this is pretty unusual to have a press conference late in the day announcing that you're moving a prisoner. Will you make an announcement when he's actually been checked in or whatever the term is that -- (inaudible)?
MR. JOHNSON: We don't have a plan to do that at the moment. I suspect that you all will become aware of that at the point at which he arrives at Leavenworth.
Q: When did it become apparent that Manning needed some special level of care that he wasn't getting at Quantico, and who made that recommendation or that decision?
MR. JOHNSON: Well, I wouldn't characterize it that way.
We've been thinking about this for a while. We began to take a fairly comprehensive look at Quantico as well as other facilities that have pre-trial confinement capability, and we concluded, after spending a couple of weeks on this, that at this juncture of the case, now that the 706 inquiry process is over -- and the interview of him as part of that process took place Saturday before last -- and given the fact that he's been in pre-trial confinement for I think about 10 months now, and Quantico is a facility that normally does not have pre-trial confinees for that length of time, and then when you look forward at the likely time before this case goes to trial, if it goes to trial, the combination of those plus the facility at Leavenworth, a new facility which has a pre-trial confinee capability that opened in January, led us to the conclusion at this juncture of the case it was -- it was a good thing to transfer him even though the case is going to stay in Washington.
STAFF: Secretary Westphal may have something to add to that.
MR. WESTPHAL: Well, I would just say that, you know, our responsibility -- you know, Private Manning is a -- is a soldier, and our responsibility as an Army is not only to adjudicate his case, but also to take care of him while he is in pre-trial confinement.
As the counsel mentioned, this particular facility -- there are two Army facilities at Leavenworth. One is the old barracks, which is for individuals after trial. This i |
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Name(s:) |
Jeh Johnson, Dawn Hilton |
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Title: |
General Counsel, Commander of the Joint Regional Correctional Factiliy at Fort Leavenworth Kansas |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement, Article 13 |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/C1Qr7 |
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Title: |
Joint Regional Correctional Facility Fact Sheet |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Joint Regional Correctional Facility, Fort Leavenworth Kansas, Departmnet of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement, Article 13 |
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Title: |
WikiLeaks soldier being moved to Fort Leavenworth. Pentagon Press briefing (FULL VERSION) |
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Author: |
3rdID8487 |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement, Article 13 |
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Title: |
Army to Transfer Manning to Leavenworth |
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Author: |
Donna Miles |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning, Unlawful Pretrial Confinement, Article 13 |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Pretrial Begins for Alleged Document Leaker |
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Author: |
Elaine Sanchez |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Pretrial Wraps Up for Alleged Document Leaker |
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Author: |
Donna Miles |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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