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We consider this reporting from posts around the world to be one of our most valuable contributions to every facet of national security, and we share this diplomatic reporting through automatic dissemination to over 65 agencies based on profiled requirements these agencies provide to the Department. Recent events have not changed our commitment to sharing this vital information.
WikiLeaks Disclosures and State Department Mitigation Actions
July 2010
When DoD material was leaked in July 2010, we worked with DoD to identify any alleged State Department material that was in WikiLeaks' possession. We immediately asked Chiefs of Mission at affected posts to review any purported State material in the release and provide an assessment, as well as a summary of the overall effect the WikiLeaks release could have on relations with the host country.
Following the completion of the review in August, when it was believed that purported State cables might be released, the State Department instructed all Chiefs of Missions to familiarize themselves with the content in the Net Centric Diplomacy (NCD) database should a release actually occur.
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November 2010
When the press and WikiLeaks announced that they were going to release purported State cables starting on November 28, 2010, the State Department took the following immediate actions: 1) Established a 24/7 WikiLeaks Working Group composed of senior officials from throughout the Department, notably our regional bureaus; 2) Created a group to review potential risks to individuals; and 3) Suspended SIPRNet access to NCD (SIPRNet is a DOD network).
The Department also created a Mitigation Team to address the policy, legal, security, counterintelligence, and information assurance issues presented by the release of these documents. During this period, the Department kept Congress apprised of both the international fallout caused by the WikiLeaks' disclosure and the steps undertaken to mitigate them. The Department convened two separate briefings for members of both the House of Representatives and the Senate within days (December 2, 2010) of the first disclosure by WikiLeaks and appeared twice before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (December 7 and 9, 2010).
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Ongoing Mitigation Efforts
State continues its thorough review of policies and procedures related to information security to ensure that they fully meet the current challenges. Efforts are being coordinated throughout the Department, as well as with the interagency, to ensure that we share classified information in an effective and secure manner with those who need it in their work to advance our national security.
While the Department already had strong safeguards in place, we have further enhanced and updated our computer security policies that prohibit the downloading of classified information to removable media (e.g., thumb drives, CDs/DVDs) on the Department's classified network. The Department continues to deploy an automated tool that audits and monitors the Department's classified network to detect anomalies that would not otherwise be apparent. This capability is backed up by professional staff who promptly analyze detected anomalies to ensure that they do not represent threats to the system.
The NCD database of diplomatic reporting and the State Department's classified web sites, although now inaccessible through SIPRNet, remains available via the more limited distribution Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). Throughout, the State Department has continued to share its diplomatic reporting among federal agencies through its traditional system of cable dissemination.
To heighten awareness of what is and is not permitted when working on the Department's classified network and on classified systems, user awareness reminders are now available for Department employees on its classified network, in addition to the standard in-person briefings about handling classified material and a soon-to-be-released computer-based course on identifying and marking classified and sensitive information.
In addition, the Department is exploring solutions to improve how we share and protect information with those who are not direct recipients of our telegrams. One such solution would involve the creation of a website with a searchable database that would allow appropriately cleared personnel to use key word searches to discover relevant State cables; the search would reveal cable metadata, such as the subject line, but would not provide the full text of the cables in a potentially vulnerable database. This would ensure that cleared personnel are aware of cables they have an operational or strategic need to see. Cleared personnel from other agencies would then be able to seek cables necessary for their work functions through their own organization's internal distribution system. The responsibility will be on the receiving, not the originating, agency to disseminate information to its internal personnel.
The Department has continued to work with the interagency on information management issues by participating in meetings of the new Interagency Policy Committee (IPC) chaired by the Special Advisor for Information Access and Security policy as well as existing IPCs such as the Information Sharing and Access IPC. |
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Name(s:) |
Patrick Kennedy |
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Title: |
Under Secretary for Management |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of State |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/OfVrA |
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On August 12, 2010, immediately following the first release of documents, the Secretary of Defense commissioned two internal DoD studies. The first study, led by the Under Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (USD(I)), directed a review of DoD information security policy. The second study, led by the Joint Staff, focused on procedures for handling classified information in forward deployed areas. The Secretary also tasked the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency to stand up an Information Review Task Force to assess, in concert with interagency participants, the substance of the data disclosed.
Results of the two studies revealed a number of findings, including the following:
Forward deployed units maintained an over-reliance on removable electronic storage media.
Roles and responsibilities for detecting and dealing with an insider threat must be better defined.
Processes for reporting security incidents need improvement. Limited capability currently exists to detect and monitor anomalous behavior on classified computer networks.
Once the studies were concluded and the results reported to the Secretary, the Department began working to address the findings and improve its overall security posture to mitigate the possibility of another similar type of disclosure. Some of this work was already planned or underway. For other findings, like the issue of removable media, new initiatives had to be immediately implemented. |
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Name(s:) |
Teresa Takai, Thomas Ferguson |
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Title: |
Chief Information Officer, Principal Deputy Undersecretary |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/OfVrA |
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As the IC Information Sharing Executive (IC ISE), my main focus today concerns classified information - and, in particular, information that is derived from intelligence sources and menthols, or information that is reflected in the analytic judgements and assessments that the IC produces. I want to be clear, though, that our concern for the protection of information is not restricted to the fragility of sources and methods, but extends as well to broader aspects of national security. We recognize, and will hear today, that the Departments of State and Defense, as well as other federal agencies, themselves originate classified national security information that is vital to the protection of our nation and conduct of our foreign relations,a and this information, widely distributed, and used throughout the government to achieve these objectives. As we have seen recently, the unauthorized disclosure of any form of classified national security information has serious implications for the policy and operational aspects of national security. |
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Name(s:) |
Corin Stone |
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Title: |
Intelligence Community Information Sharing Executive |
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Agency(ies): |
Office of the Director of National Intelligence |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/OfVrA |
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In the five years since Congress directed the creation of the Information Sharing environment, significant steps have been taken towards establishing a string foundations. Important mission initiatives, such as the Nationwide Suspicious Activity Reporting Initiative, and core capabilities and enablers, such as the National Network of Fusion Centers and the National Information Exchange Model, have produced results and show ongoing promise_
The WikiLeaks breach is not principally an information sharing problem; at its root a bad actor allegedly violated the trust placed in him. |
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Name(s:) |
Paul Kshemendra |
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Title: |
Program Manager for the Information Environment |
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Agency(ies): |
Office of the Director of National Intelligence |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/OfVrA |
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Takai told Senate members that Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates immediately called for two internal studies to review the department's information security policy and to unveil how classified information is handled in forward-deployed areas. The results showed that forward-deployed units had an 'over-reliance' on using removable electronic storage media, Takai said. |
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Name(s:) |
Terri Moon Crunk |
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Agency(ies): |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/4DMyk |
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Title: |
Information Sharing and WikiLeaks |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
C-SPAN |
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Title: |
Information Sharing in the Era of WikiLeaks: Balancing Security and Collaboration |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, United States Senate |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Congressional Record |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Government Printing Office |
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Title: |
Congressional Record |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Government Printing Office |
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Title: |
Congressional Record |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
United States Government Printing Office |
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