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The original charges were preferred on 5 July 2010. Those charges were dismissed by the convening authority on 18 March 2011. The current charges were preferred on 1 March 2011. On 16 December through 22 December 2011, these charges were investigated by an Article 32 Investigating Officer. The charges were subsequently referred without special instructions to a general court-martial on 3 February 2012. |
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Name(s:) |
David Coombs |
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Title: |
civilian defense counsel |
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Concerning: |
Charges, Afghan War Diary, Espionage, Specification 7, Charge II, 18 USC 793(e), 793(e), Article 134, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Yes, Ma'am. The parties just discussed this issue Ma'am, and the United States, I guess-- has amended with the concurrence of the defense the two charges Specification 5 and 7 of a copy of a the original charge sheet that will become the new original. Specification 5 has been amended to say 'in that Private First Class Bradley Manning, US Army did at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq and at or near Rockville, Maryland' and then the remaining portion. And then the same-- the same amendment has occurred to Specification 7 your Honor. |
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Name(s:) |
Ashden Fein |
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Title: |
Prosecutor |
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Agency(ies): |
United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/Uynuk |
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Title: |
March 1, 2011 Charge Sheet |
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Concerning: |
"Bradley Manning Charge Sheet March 1 2011, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Title: |
US v Pfc. Manning | Transcript of Manning's formal plea to the charges including excepted and substituted language |
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Author: |
Alexa O'Brien |
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Title: |
Journalist |
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2010-02-09 |
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The original charges were preferred on 5 July 2010. Those charges were dismissed by the convening authority on 18 March 2011. The current charges were preferred on 1 March 2011. On 16 December through 22 December 2011, these charges were investigated by an Article 32 Investigating Officer. The charges were subsequently referred without special instructions to a general court-martial on 3 February 2012. |
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Name(s:) |
David Coombs |
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Title: |
civilian defense counsel |
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Concerning: |
Charges, Afghan War Diary, Espionage, Specification 7, Charge II, 18 USC 793(e), 793(e), Article 134, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Yes, Ma'am. The parties just discussed this issue Ma'am, and the United States, I guess-- has amended with the concurrence of the defense the two charges Specification 5 and 7 of a copy of a the original charge sheet that will become the new original. Specification 5 has been amended to say 'in that Private First Class Bradley Manning, US Army did at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq and at or near Rockville, Maryland' and then the remaining portion. And then the same-- the same amendment has occurred to Specification 7 your Honor. |
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Name(s:) |
Ashden Fein |
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Title: |
Prosecutor |
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Agency(ies): |
United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/Uynuk |
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Title: |
March 1, 2011 Charge Sheet |
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Concerning: |
"Bradley Manning Charge Sheet March 1 2011, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Title: |
US v Pfc. Manning | Transcript of Manning's formal plea to the charges including excepted and substituted language |
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Author: |
Alexa O'Brien |
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Title: |
Journalist |
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The original charges were preferred on 5 July 2010. Those charges were dismissed by the convening authority on 18 March 2011. The current charges were preferred on 1 March 2011. On 16 December through 22 December 2011, these charges were investigated by an Article 32 Investigating Officer. The charges were subsequently referred without special instructions to a general court-martial on 3 February 2012. |
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Name(s:) |
David Coombs |
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Title: |
civilian defense counsel |
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Concerning: |
Charges, Afghan War Diary, Stealing USG Property, Specification 6, Charge II, 18 USC 641, 641, Article 134, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Title: |
March 1, 2011 Charge Sheet |
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Concerning: |
"Bradley Manning Charge Sheet March 1 2011, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Title: |
US v Pfc. Manning | Transcript of Manning's formal plea to the charges including excepted and substituted language |
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Author: |
Alexa O'Brien |
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Title: |
Journalist |
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2010-01-08 |
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The original charges were preferred on 5 July 2010. Those charges were dismissed by the convening authority on 18 March 2011. The current charges were preferred on 1 March 2011. On 16 December through 22 December 2011, these charges were investigated by an Article 32 Investigating Officer. The charges were subsequently referred without special instructions to a general court-martial on 3 February 2012. |
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Name(s:) |
David Coombs |
|
Title: |
civilian defense counsel |
|
Concerning: |
Charges, Afghan War Diary, Stealing USG Property, Specification 6, Charge II, 18 USC 641, 641, Article 134, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Title: |
March 1, 2011 Charge Sheet |
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Concerning: |
"Bradley Manning Charge Sheet March 1 2011, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
|
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Title: |
US v Pfc. Manning | Transcript of Manning's formal plea to the charges including excepted and substituted language |
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Author: |
Alexa O'Brien |
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Title: |
Journalist |
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Yes, Ma'am. The parties just discussed this issue Ma'am, and the United States, I guess-- has amended with the concurrence of the defense the two charges Specification 5 and 7 of a copy of a the original charge sheet that will become the new original. Specification 5 has been amended to say 'in that Private First Class Bradley Manning, US Army did at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq and at or near Rockville, Maryland' and then the remaining portion. And then the same-- the same amendment has occurred to Specification 7 your Honor. |
|
Name(s:) |
Ashden Fein |
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Title: |
Prosecutor |
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Agency(ies): |
United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
Charges, Afghan War Diary, Espionage, Specification 7, Charge II, 18 USC 793(e), 793(e), Article 134, Manning Plea, Plea, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/h6nSi |
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Title: |
US v Pfc. Manning | Transcript of Manning's formal plea to the charges including excepted and substituted language |
|
Author: |
Alexa O'Brien |
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Title: |
Journalist |
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Title: |
March 1, 2011 Charge Sheet |
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2010-02-03 |
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Yes, Ma'am. The parties just discussed this issue Ma'am, and the United States, I guess-- has amended with the concurrence of the defense the two charges Specification 5 and 7 of a copy of a the original charge sheet that will become the new original. Specification 5 has been amended to say 'in that Private First Class Bradley Manning, US Army did at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq and at or near Rockville, Maryland' and then the remaining portion. And then the same-- the same amendment has occurred to Specification 7 your Honor. |
|
Name(s:) |
Ashden Fein |
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Title: |
Prosecutor |
|
Agency(ies): |
United States Army, Department of Defense |
|
Concerning: |
Charges, Afghan War Diary, Espionage, Specification 7, Charge II, 18 USC 793(e), 793(e), Article 134, Manning Plea, Plea, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/h6nSi |
|
Title: |
US v Pfc. Manning | Transcript of Manning's formal plea to the charges including excepted and substituted language |
|
Author: |
Alexa O'Brien |
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Title: |
Journalist |
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Title: |
March 1, 2011 Charge Sheet |
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The original charges were preferred on 5 July 2010. Those charges were dismissed by the convening authority on 18 March 2011. The current charges were preferred on 1 March 2011. On 16 December through 22 December 2011, these charges were investigated by an Article 32 Investigating Officer. The charges were subsequently referred without special instructions to a general court-martial on 3 February 2012. |
|
Name(s:) |
David Coombs |
|
Title: |
civilian defense counsel |
|
Concerning: |
Charges, Afghan War Diary, Stealing USG Property, Specification 6, Charge II, 18 USC 641, 641, Article 134, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
|
Url: |
Url Link
|
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Title: |
March 1, 2011 Charge Sheet |
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Concerning: |
"Bradley Manning Charge Sheet March 1 2011, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Title: |
US v Pfc. Manning | Transcript of Manning's formal plea to the charges including excepted and substituted language |
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Author: |
Alexa O'Brien |
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Title: |
Journalist |
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Yes, Ma'am. The parties just discussed this issue Ma'am, and the United States, I guess-- has amended with the concurrence of the defense the two charges Specification 5 and 7 of a copy of a the original charge sheet that will become the new original. Specification 5 has been amended to say 'in that Private First Class Bradley Manning, US Army did at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq and at or near Rockville, Maryland' and then the remaining portion. And then the same-- the same amendment has occurred to Specification 7 your Honor. |
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Name(s:) |
Ashden Fein |
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Title: |
Prosecutor |
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Agency(ies): |
United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
Charges, Afghan War Diary, Espionage, Specification 7, Charge II, 18 USC 793(e), 793(e), Article 134, Manning Plea, Plea, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
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Url: |
Url Link
|
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/h6nSi |
|
Title: |
US v Pfc. Manning | Transcript of Manning's formal plea to the charges including excepted and substituted language |
|
Author: |
Alexa O'Brien |
|
Title: |
Journalist |
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|
Title: |
March 1, 2011 Charge Sheet |
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The original charges were preferred on 5 July 2010. Those charges were dismissed by the convening authority on 18 March 2011. The current charges were preferred on 1 March 2011. On 16 December through 22 December 2011, these charges were investigated by an Article 32 Investigating Officer. The charges were subsequently referred without special instructions to a general court-martial on 3 February 2012. |
|
Name(s:) |
David Coombs |
|
Title: |
civilian defense counsel |
|
Concerning: |
Charges, Afghan War Diary, Espionage, Specification 7, Charge II, 18 USC 793(e), 793(e), Article 134, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
|
Url: |
Url Link
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|
Yes, Ma'am. The parties just discussed this issue Ma'am, and the United States, I guess-- has amended with the concurrence of the defense the two charges Specification 5 and 7 of a copy of a the original charge sheet that will become the new original. Specification 5 has been amended to say 'in that Private First Class Bradley Manning, US Army did at or near Contingency Operating Station Hammer, Iraq and at or near Rockville, Maryland' and then the remaining portion. And then the same-- the same amendment has occurred to Specification 7 your Honor. |
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Name(s:) |
Ashden Fein |
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Title: |
Prosecutor |
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Agency(ies): |
United States Army, Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/Uynuk |
|
Title: |
March 1, 2011 Charge Sheet |
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Concerning: |
"Bradley Manning Charge Sheet March 1 2011, United States v. Pfc. Bradley Manning |
|
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Title: |
US v Pfc. Manning | Transcript of Manning's formal plea to the charges including excepted and substituted language |
|
Author: |
Alexa O'Brien |
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Title: |
Journalist |
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Title: |
Pentagon Assesses Leaked Documents |
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Author: |
Michael Carden |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Archive Link |
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I also urged the House leaders to pass the necessary funding to support our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan. I know much has been written about this in recent days as a result of the substantial leak of documents from Afghanistan covering a period from 2004 to 2009.
While I'm concerned about the disclosure of sensitive information from the battlefield that could potentially jeopardize individuals or operations, the fact is these documents don't reveal any issues that haven't already informed our public debate on Afghanistan; indeed, they point to the same challenges that led me to conduct an extensive review of our policy last fall. So let me underscore what I've said many times: For seven years, we failed to implement a strategy adequate to the challenge in this region, the region from which the 9/11 attacks were waged and other attacks against the United States and our friends and allies have been planned.
That's why we've substantially increased our commitment there, insisted upon greater accountability from our partners in Afghanistan and Pakistan, developed a new strategy that can work, and put in place a team, including one of our finest generals, to execute that plan. Now we have to see that strategy through. And as I told the leaders, I hope the House will act today to join the Senate, which voted unanimously in favor of this funding, to ensure that our troops have the resources they need and that we're able to do what's necessary for our national security. |
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Name(s:) |
Barack Obama |
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Title: |
President of the United States |
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Agency(ies): |
White House |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/I3kTB |
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Title: |
Remarks by the President After Bipartisan Leadership Meeting, Rose Garden |
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Author: |
Barack Obama |
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Title: |
President of the United States |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
White House |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Presidential Remarks on WikiLeaks of Classified Documents |
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Author: |
Barack Obama |
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Title: |
President of the United States |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
White House |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Title: |
Obama: Issues in Leaked Documents Led to Review |
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Author: |
Lisa Daniel |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Archive Link |
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Q General Campbell, Barbara Starr from CNN. When you look at something like Wikileaks, as a commander, what concerns you about the -- specifically, if you can, about the disclosure of that type of information and the risk that it can pose to troops, operations and Afghan civilians who assist you? And I ask this because so many people are trying to assess is this really a critical leak of information, or is it just a huge volume of relatively low-level material.
GEN. CAMPBELL: Hi, Barbara. Good to see you again.
First off as you know, we've been tied up with this DUSTWUN operation. So I've not really read any of the 92,000-plus documents that have reported to be leaked.
I would just tell you from my perspective though, anytime there's any sort of leak of classified material, it has the potential to harm or put in harm's way the military folks that are working out here every day, to preserve that.
So I have not seen any specific examples of what's in that. I've been tied up with this DUSTWUN operation 24/7. If it does in fact name names of people that have worked with coalition forces, I could see that that would have a detriment down the road.
My read just briefly from looking at a couple articles early this morning is that much of the stuff that has come out there is really not new news. It's between 2004 and I think December 2009. Most of that I think we've heard about.
So I didn't think there was anything staggering or new that we didn't know. There are some issues there about the Pakistan interaction and the tie-in with what's going on over here.
I would just tell you that we're really working hard with our Pakistan counterparts. I have Pakistani LNOs in the JOC here. I've been over to Pakistan since I've been here, to work with the XI Corps and the Frontier Corps.
I think we have a great opportunity here in the next six to nine months, with the leadership that we have on the border of Pakistan and down to the battalion level, to really work that aggressively.
There have been a lot of operations the last year-plus in Pakistan along the border. I think they realize that we face a common foe and we have to work together, to get rid of that common foe, to make sure that we don't have safe havens in Pakistan.
And some -- I think there's some potential to do good stuff. But as far as the Wikileaks, I don't think there's a great impact currently on us here today. And we have not changed any of our operations or any strategy here based on that. |
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Name(s:) |
John Campbell |
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Title: |
Commander |
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Agency(ies): |
Regional Command East in Afghanistan, Combined Joint Task Force 101,101st Airborne Division, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
Afghan War Diary |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/cL0Wr |
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Pentagon spokesman Marine Corps Col. Dave Lapan said today that U.S. troops in Afghanistan are hearing discontent from Afghan partners, whose names were revealed in the documents leak. Some Afghan nationals work with coalition forces to provide information and whereabouts of militants and insurgent activities.
[...]
'There's been displeasure from folks whose names appeared there,' Lapan said. 'Anyone whose name appears in those documents is at risk. It could be a threat to their lives, or to their future conduct' in support of coalition forces. |
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Name(s:) |
Dave Lapan |
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Title: |
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Media Operations |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/qDk9O |
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SEC. GATES: Good afternoon. I would first like to start with some comments about the release and subsequent publication of classified military documents earlier this week.
First, as the president stated, the problems identified and the issues raised in these documents relating to the war in Afghanistan have been well known in and out of government for some time. In fact, it was the recognition of many of these challenges that led to the president to conduct an extensive review of our Afghan strategy last year, which concluded that our mission there needed a fundamentally new approach.
These documents represent a mountain of raw data and individual impressions, most several years old, devoid of context or analysis. They do not represent official positions or policy. And they do not, in my view, fundamentally call into question the efficacy of our current strategy in Afghanistan and its prospects for success.
Having said all that, the battlefield consequences of the release of these documents are potentially severe and dangerous for our troops, our allies and Afghan partners, and may well damage our relationships and reputation in that key part of the world. Intelligence sources and methods, as well as military tactics, techniques and procedures, will become known to our adversaries.
This department is conducting a thorough, aggressive investigation to determine how this leak occurred, to identify the person or persons responsible, and to assess the content of the information compromised. We have a moral responsibility to do everything possible to mitigate the consequences for our troops and our partners downrange, especially those who have worked with and put their trust in us in the past, who now may be targeted for retribution.
Yesterday, I called FBI Director Robert Mueller and asked for the FBI's assistance in our investigation as a partner. It is important that we have all the resources we need to investigate and assess this breach of national security. Furthermore, the department is taking action in theater to prevent a repeat of such a breach, to include tightening procedures for accessing and transporting classified information.
As a general proposition, we endeavor to push access to sensitive battlefield information down to where it is most useful -- on the front lines -- where as a practical matter there are fewer restrictions and controls than at rear headquarters. In the wake of this incident, it will be a real challenge to strike the right balance between security and providing our frontline troops the information they need.
The U.S. military's success over the years rests on the abilities and integrity of its men and women in uniform and our trust in them. This trust is represented by the fact that, relative to other countries' armed forces, our military culture is one that on the battlefield places great responsibility on the shoulders of even junior servicemembers, to include entrusting them with sensitive information. The American way of war depends upon it.
But to earn and maintain that trust, we must all be responsible in handling, protecting and safeguarding our nation's secrets. For years there has been what I would call appropriate criticism of excessive classification and over-classification of information. However, this recent release of documents is a pointed reminder that much secret information is treated as such to protect sources of information, to protect the lives of our men and women in uniform, to deny our enemies the information about our military operations, and to preserve our relationships with friends and allies.
This recent massive breach should be a reminder to all entrusted with our secrets that there are potentially dramatic and grievously harmful consequences of violations of trust and responsibility. We will aggressively investigate and, wherever possible, prosecute such violations.
Chairman.
[...]
Q Mr. Secretary, do you believe that the investigation should go beyond the source or sources of the leak within the military to include those who received or used the information -- WikiLeaks, the news media? And does the presence of the FBI in the investigation indicate such a widening of its scope?
SEC. GATES: Obviously, in the middle of an investigation, and particularly one that is in the military justice system, there's very little that I can say because of the potential for command influence. My basic position, though, is the investigation should go wherever it needs to go. And one of the reasons that I asked the director of the FBI to partner with us in this is to ensure that it can go wherever it needs to go.
Q To include potentially beyond --
SEC. GATES: I'll just -- I'll just leave it at that.
Julian.
Q Sir, PFC Bradley Manning was charged earlier with another leak to WikiLeaks. Do you feel that there was not -- was there an aggressive enough effort to examine what he accessed that he was not supposed to access? Have you thoroughly looked at what documents he, who's already accused, might have looked at in addition to what he's already been charged with?
SEC. GATES: Well, obviously, what I just said in response to Anne's question goes here, too. I'm just not going to talk about any specific individual or the status of the investigation.
Q If I could try again, then, on a slightly different matter. Is there -- are you -- you mentioned that there would be some changes at the tactical level in Iraq. Are you concerned that -- is it a problem that the rules -- there were insufficient rules in place, or that rules were not followed to the letter that allowed breaches on the front line?
SEC. GATES: Well, again, the -- based on what I've been briefed on and what I knew before, as I said in my statement, if the kind of breach involved in the downloading of these thousands of documents had occurred at a rear headquarters or here in the U.S., very high likelihood we would have detected it.
But the interesting thing is -- and it really was one of the lessons learned from the first Gulf War in 1991 -- was how little useful intelligence information was being received by battalion and company commanders in the field. And so there has been an effort over the last 15 or so years in the military, and I would say really accelerated during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, to push as much information as far forward as possible, which means putting it in a secret channel that almost everybody has access to in uniform, and obviously many civilians as well.
We want those soldiers in a forward operating base to have all the information they possibly can have that impacts on their own security, but also being able to accomplish their mission. And so one of the things that we are going to have to look at with General Petraeus, and soon General Austin, is what kind of -- should we change the way we approach that, or do we -- do we continue to take the risk?
And there are some technological solutions. Most of them are not immediately available to us. But figuring out if we need to change the balance I think is one of the issues that independent of the investigations that all of us are going to have to work on.
[...]
SEC. GATES: I would -- I would just add one other thing. The thing to remember here is that this is a huge amount of raw data, as I said at the outset of my remarks. There is no accountability. There is no sense of responsibility. It is sort of thrown out there for take as you will and damn the consequences.
Q With all due respect, you didn't answer the question.
Q Mr. Secretary, if I could just come back a minute, the fact is, the department -- the U.S. military knew weeks ago; it is part of the public record that tens of thousands of documents had been downloaded. Without referencing any particular legal matter, it has been in the public record released by this department. Charge sheets had been filed. The department, the military knew. So why the surprise? Why didn't the military move faster to assess this, to establish a team to assess it, to bring the FBI in? Charges were filed about tens of thousan |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Url: |
Url Link
|
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/yYDfm |
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|
ADM. MULLEN: Thank you, Mr. Secretary. I certainly share your concerns about the recklessness with which classified documents were both leaked and then posted online.
As I said earlier this week, I am appalled by this behavior, and, frankly, outraged that anyone in their right mind would think it valuable to make public even one sensitive report, let alone tens of thousands of them, about a war that is being waged.
Yes, the documents are old and essentially raw inputs to our intelligence and operations apparatus. And yes, much of what has been revealed has already been commonly understood by the public or otherwise covered in the media. I can assure you, having just come from visits to Afghanistan and Pakistan, that none of what I've seen posted online or reported in the press affects our overarching strategy. But, frankly, that's not why this is so destructive. The sheer size and scope of the collection now demands a careful review to determine the degree to which future tactical operations may be impacted, and the degree to which the lives of our troops and Afghan partners may be at risk. And I think we always need to be mindful of the unknown potential for damage in any particular document that we handle.
Mr. Assange can say whatever he likes about the greater good he thinks he and his source are doing, but the truth is they might already have on their hands the blood of some young soldier or that of an Afghan family. Disagree with the war all you want, take issue with the policy, challenge me or our ground commanders on the decisions we make to accomplish the mission we've been given, but don't put those who willingly go into harm's way even further in harm's way just to satisfy your need to make a point.
And while I'm at it, let me make one: A big part of my trip -- indeed, a big part of my time as chairman -- has revolved around building and sustaining relationships. Everywhere I went over the last 10 days, those relationships were front and center -- not just for me, but for our commanders and for our diplomats.
I saw it in Kabul, where Ambassador Eikenberry and General Petraeus have forged a strong team and an even stronger dialogue with the Karzai administration.
I saw it in Kandahar city, where I met with a company of U.S. MPs living and working side by side with Afghan police at a security station near the outskirts of town.
I saw it in Islamabad in yet another of my engagements with General Kayani. He spent an entire afternoon flying me to northern Pakistan so I could see for myself some of the rugged terrain he and his troops have to patrol.
If we've learned nothing else in fighting these wars, it's that relationships matter. They are vital. We are not going to kill our way to success, and we sure aren't going to achieve success alone. So in addition to making sure we understand the tactical risks from these leaks, I think it's incumbent upon us not to let the good relations -- relationships we've established and the trust we've worked so hard to build throughout the region also become a casualty.
Thank you.
[...]
ADM. MULLEN: Let me take this.
SEC. GATES: Yeah, yeah.
ADM. MULLEN: Can I just add -- make one additional comment to that, is in that change, what it has done is it has put -- pushed -- put us in a position to much better match the enemy in terms of speed of war. It's integrated intelligence more rapidly into operations, which then generates more intelligence, which allows us to operate much more effectively. And I think, obviously, as the secretary said, we're going to have to take a look at what this investigation tells us and make sure that we have the balance exactly right.
Q Admiral Mullen, you have mentioned that the founder of WikiLeaks may have blood on his hands. Do you know, have people been killed over this information?
ADM. MULLEN: They're still -- what I am concerned about with this is I think individuals who are not involved in this kind of warfare and expose this kind of information can't -- from my perspective, can't appreciate how this kind of information is routinely networked together inside the classified channels we use specifically.
And it's very difficult, if you don't do this and understand this, to understand the impact, and very specifically the potential that is there -- that is there to risk lives of our soldiers and sailors, airmen and Marines, coalition warfighters, as well -- as well as Afghan citizens. And there's no doubt in my mind about that.
Q What --
[...]
ADM. MULLEN: I think the heart of your question goes to the ISI. And specifically -- and I've said before and would repeat that it's an organization that, actually, we have, in ways, a very positive relationship, very healthy relationship between our intelligence organizations.
And there have been -- that said, there have been elements of the ISI that have got relationships -- a relationship with extremist organizations, and that we -- you know, I, we, consider that unacceptable. In the long run, I think that the ISI has to strategically shift its -- tied in great part to what the secretary's laid out -- focused on its view of its own national-security interests.
These are issues that -- and I have seen some of this; I was just with General Kayani again, and this is a subject we frequently discuss. And they have, as the secretary said, in that country, captured lots of terrorists, killed lots of terrorists, focused on terrorism. And they are strategically shifting.
That doesn't mean that they are through that shift at all, and they do still -- they are still focused on rebuilding this trust as well, and it is not yet rebuilt. |
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Name(s:) |
Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Chair |
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Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Url Link
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Archive Link
http://archive.is/yYDfm |
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WikiLeaks Release of Classified War Documents, Jul 29, 2010 |
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Author: |
Robert Gates, Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense, Chair |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Title: |
DOD News Briefing with Secretary Gates and Adm. Mullen from the Pentagon |
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Author: |
Robert Gates, Mike Mullen |
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Title: |
Chair |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
"Afghan War Diary |
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Archive Link |
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Title: |
Gates Calls on FBI to Join Leak Investigation |
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Author: |
Jim Garamone |
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American Forces Press Service, Department of Defense |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, U.S. Navy, conduct a joint press conference in the Pentagon on July 29, 2010. The leak of many thousands of classified documents on the WikiLeaks website was the chief topic under discussion. DoD photo by R. D. Ward. (Released) |
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Authoring or Creator Agency: |
Department of Defense |
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Audio Press Release |
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Public Affairs, Pentagon, Department of Defense |
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General Conway is the 34th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps, General James T. Conway. General Conway has served as Commandant since November 13th of 2006, and is one of only two Commandants to serve his entire tenure during wartime... General Conway just returned from a trip to the Central Command region. Specifically, he and his group visited Romania, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Landstuhl, Germany. General Conway spent the majority of his trip visiting Marines and sailors in Helmand province in Afghanistan. And General Conway will retire this fall after more than 40 years of service. And he'll, again, give you a briefing on his recent travels, and then take your questions.
[...]
Q Thank you, General. Three questions into one. One, how does this WikiLeaks impact on your mission in Afghanistan? And two, as far as floods in Pakistan is concerned, is it impacting the mission in Afghanistan? And finally, as far as withdrawal and the mission change in Iraq, how does your soldiers or your Marines or your -- I mean people in Afghanistan are thinking that you can learn some method, some -- can you learn some lessons from Iraq into your mission in Afghanistan?
GEN. CONWAY: Sir, I missed the first question. Would you restate it?
Q WikiLeaks.
GEN. CONWAY: Okay.
Q Yes, sir.
GEN. CONWAY: Okay. WikiLeaks was not helpful, to the degree that I think our partners are concerned that we could have such a serious breach. At the same time -- and I haven't -- I haven't examined all the documents. I haven't tasked anybody to do that. At the same time, except, perhaps, for compromising some of our sources, I don't think that it's being felt tactically on the battlefield. My troops chose not to raise it with me in a single question-and-answer session, so I don't think that the impact is severe, except as it relates to our capacity to maintain secrets.
The MEUs that are supporting Pakistan are the theater reserve for the theater commander. That he has chosen and elected to commit both the MEU that's there now and the future MEU, at least for a time, to Pakistan crisis requirements I think strips him of some of that capability to respond elsewhere in theater. But for purposes of Marines in Helmand, there is no impact. We aren't relying upon any of the MEU capacity in Helmand province to be able to continue our functions there.
In terms of Iraq, you know, we're out of Iraq, for all intents and purposes, have been now for the better part of a year, started the process really about a year before that. But we asked ourselves, to the essence of your question, what lessons are transferable -- that we learned over four or five years in Iraq -- to Afghanistan as we built up our presence there.
And we found there was about 70 percent application, probably, I mean, but you've got a different culture, different environment, different language, different tribal construct, different leadership, of course, that we've got to deal with. And so we focused on the delta.
We focused on that 30 percent and tried to, you know, inject that into our training to make our leadership more prepared and that manner of thing. And that's working for us.
None of it gets far from our old Small Wars Manual. You know, Marines back in the '20s in Central and South America learned many of these lessons in terms of this transition process that we talked about earlier. So a manual that's soon to be 100 years old has really been our beacon for the way ahead in terms of how we approach.
Q And so finally, troops are watching all the news, ups and downs, what is --
GEN. CONWAY: They're incredible informed, they really are.
Q -- what is happening around the globe.
GEN. CONWAY: Yeah.
Q How do you keep their morale? Because things change in their minds also, whatever they watch, whatever they hear, whatever they see.
GEN. CONWAY: Yeah. Well, again, I emphasize to them, the number-one concern on the part of American troops anywhere they go is the country behind us. That was the case in 2003. That's the case today in 2010.
And I'll tell you, I am so proud of our American public, that regardless how they see what happened in Iraq or what's happening in Afghanistan, they support the troops. And that's the message that they get from me; that's the message that they see when they come home on dwell. And in that regard, I'm just incredibly proud of our country.
Over here. Yes, sir. |
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Name(s:) |
James Conway |
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Title: |
Commandant |
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Agency(ies): |
United States Marine Corps, Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
Afghan War Diary |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/efxhg |
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Q: Thank you. Yes, President Karzai has been described in a trove of secret diplomatic American cables as erratic, problematic; and by -- and described by the American ambassador as not a reliable ally. Are those assessments incorrect? And how embarrassing is this for the United States?
SECRETARY GATES: Well, I would say that the WikiLeaks and -- leak -- revelation of all of these documents is extraordinarily embarrassing for the United States. But at the end of the day, nations make -- and leaders make decisions based on their interests. And I would say that America's best partners and friends -- and I include among them President Karzai -- have responded to this, in my view, in an extraordinarily statesmanlike way. And I'm deeply grateful. And frankly, I think the American government will not forget this kind of statesmanlike response.
I think I also could say, with great confidence, President Karzai and I have been meeting together privately now for four years, and I don't think either of us would be embarrassed to have a single thing we have said to each other made public.
So this relationship will go on, because it's in our interests, and we have a shared vision for this country.
[...]
Q As Secretary Gates indicated, U.S. and Afghan officials have both said that the training of Afghan security forces over the past year has gone better than projected. Does this mean that the government of Afghanistan could possibly take primary responsibility for its security before the end of 2014?
And President Karzai, could you explain further why you chose 2014 as a transition date? To what degree did this have any -- was this done to de-emphasize President Obama's promise to begin withdrawing U.S. forces this July?
SECRETARY: Well, first of all, I would say -- I think there's a certain misimpression that the transition to Afghan lead across the country will only take place at the end of 2014. First of all, this is a process that has already begun. The Afghan government and security forces already have the primary responsibility for security here in the Kabul area. And we expect to begin that transition, as NATO said, early next spring in other areas.
So this will be a process that spreads nationwide over time and will lead to a drawdown over that period of foreign forces in Afghanistan as the Afghans are able to take increasing lead. It will be gradual and it will be -- it will depend on the conditions on the ground.
But this is a process that will go on throughout this period, that's already begun, and that will conclude at the end of 2014. It isn't something that happens just at the end of 2014.
PRESIDENT KARZAI: (In English.) With regard to the abilities of the Afghan army and police, with regard to the training of the Afghan army, the number of soldiers that we have, the number of young officers under training and the older generation of officers, the country's doing very, very well.
Having said doing very, very well, we should not be misled by the facts today. Afghanistan would continue to require much more training, especially where we absolutely need to turn our army into an institution that can stay beyond the direct engagement of the international community, that can sustain itself as an institution, that has an officers cadre that is intellectually well equipped, that is -- that has settled down as an institution, like you have in the United States or Britain or India or, for that matter, Pakistan, as well.
Now, adding to this, of equal importance, I believe, is the equipping of the army. Right now we are equipped with vital weapons and the other day General Petraeus showed me in our regular weekly security meetings. I don't know, is that a secret, or is that supposed to be -- (laughter) -- okay -- showed me --
SECRETARY: Not anymore. (Laughs; laughter)
PRESIDENT KARZAI: Not anymore. Not anymore. Well, they shouldn't share things like that with presidents, you know. We are WikiLeaks -- we --. (Laughter.) That the Afghan army will be given thousands of armored vehicles and personnel-carrier vehicles.
Of course, for us to be a fundamentally strong country with an army that can defend itself and that can be an ally with you in the United States, we would require much more: a proper air power, proper mobility of our forces and an equipment that will be good enough to sustain our country as far as security is concerned.
On the 2014 date, this wasn't designed to preempt any other date. This was talked of as being the proper date by which we would have trained ourselves and equipped ourselves; proper enough so to take on the responsibility for securing our country.
(Cross talk.)
[...]
Q: (Through translator.) From Bakhtar TV, my question is to Mr. Secretary.
You have -- you said the fight will be tough ahead and the next years you'll be fighting a tough war. But you said -- you've made progress, but you said difficult days are lying ahead, and after 2014, when the war would be tough, while Afghans wouldn't be ready by then completely, it's believed. Do you think that the Afghan forces would be able to reach that level of providing for its own capacity to stop any of those threats that could turn out to be a threat against the U.S.?
And Mr. President, in the WikiLeaks it's been said that as your chief of staff has admitted and has acknowledged receiving bags of cash from Iran, and they might have influenced even the parliament to change their subject of discussions as well.
SECRETARY: Well, first of all, I think that we have to understand that the future here is not just about military operations. It's about economic development, and it's about political reconciliation, at the end of the day.
We think, based on the progress that's been made over the past year, that the Afghan security forces are making extraordinary strides. And it's not just in the added numbers, but it's in the increased quality of our partners that we gain increased confidence.
As President Karzai said, over the next several years we need to work together in terms of properly equipping the Afghan forces so they will be able to sustain themselves. But I think -- I think the important thing -- first of all, I think we're -- we believe that the security situation will be improved to the extent that in 2014 the Afghan security forces will be able to have the lead, as they do here in Kabul, across the entire country.
I made reference in my prepared remarks to the 'vision 2015' agreement that we're working on. The United States intends to continue to be a partner and ally of Afghanistan beyond 2014. We expect the same kind of normal security relationship that we have with many countries in terms of providing training and in terms of equipping and so on. So the United States is -- while we will draw down our security forces over the years to come, we intend to be here and be a long-term friend and ally to this country.
PRESIDENT KARZAI: I didn't understand your question very well on -- (inaudible) -- contributions or cash. After Mr. Daudzai I admitted there were other reports that -- without the cash that your office admitted. There were other also cash assistance from Iran trying to influence the agenda -- the overall agenda in Afghanistan, including that in the parliament to raise subjects of and to -- (inaudible) -- subjects.
So it is -- is that -- are you talking about the other money that we said we had received? Okay. I don't think Mr. Daudzai, my chief of staff, has said anything like that. This is not true. There's no truth in this. Because Iran, as we said, once a year and recently twice a year, made some cash assistance. And no extra cash was made. If there was made any, we would certainly let you know. But no, it was just that.
And on the reports or your question about their assistance to the Afghan parliament, we have no official confirmation of such reports, I believe. And we treat them as rumors, and there is nothing -- no truth about whatever they have done to the president's office. |
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Name(s:) |
Robert Gates |
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Title: |
Secretary of Defense |
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Agency(ies): |
Department of Defense |
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Concerning: |
Afghan War Diary |
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Url: |
Url Link
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Archive: |
Archive Link
http://archive.is/3GpWV |
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